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THE BATTLE FOR OIL: FIGHTING THROUGH 
CORRUPTION & CHANGING SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
LANDSCAPES TO WIN OVER AFRICA’S 
BIGGEST GIANTS 
MODUPE ADAMOLEKUN
* 
Topic Introduction 
For many years, economic scholars paid little attention to the future of 
Africa.
1
 The continent was largely overlooked and wholly characterized 
with post-colonial perceptions of political unrest, corruption, religious 
bloodbaths, and civil strife.
2
 With the passage of time however, nations 
soon discovered that Africa was deeply imbued with rich natural resources 
and possessed a huge potential for growth. For example, in 2018, Africa 
produced more than 78% of the world’s platinum3, 46% of the world’s 
                                                                                                             
 *  Modupe Adamolekun is a law student at the University of Oklahoma, College of 
Law and on track to graduate in May 2021. Prior to law school, she worked as an accountant 
and financial analyst for a few years. While in law school, Modupe held different leadership 
positions and was a recipient of multiple awards and scholarships. Modupe would like to 
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 1. Hopeless Africa, THE ECONOMIST (May 11, 2013), https://www.economist. 
com/leaders/2000/05/11/hopeless-africa.  
 2. See Marieme Jamme, Negative Perception Slow Africa’s Development, THE 
GUARDIAN (10 Dec. 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-
matters/2010/dec/10/africa-postcolonial-perceptions (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).  
 3. U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, https://prd-wret.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/assets/palladium/production/atoms/ 
files/mcs2019_all.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).                                                               
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diamond
4, and 19% of the world’s gold.5  Africa’s oil, although only 
accounting for around 8.6% of the world’s total production, has notably 
stood out among the plethora of Africa’s natural resources, and caused a 
scurry of developed nations racing toward Africa, in what some 
interestingly labeled the “Second Scramble for Africa.”6  
With the need for African oil undeniable, Africa experienced an inflow 
of foreign direct investments (“FDI”), which in turn contributed to a 
revived economy throughout the continent.
 7
 This revived economy, along 
with improved healthcare and revamped infrastructure, created a renewed 
outlook on the once bleak prediction of Africa’s future.8 However, lurking 
behind the façade of outstretched arms and a revamped economy is a reality 
much too grim to ignore. The truth is that the fight for oil in Africa is 
intricately intertwined with corruption, and inextricably interwoven with 
manipulative conduct that continues to insulate many of Africa’s tyrannical 
leaders.   
                                                                                                             
 4. Production Statistics, DIAMOND PRODUCERS ASS’N, https://diamondproducers.com/ 
diamond-industry/productionstats/ (last visited Sep. 19, 2019).  
 5. GFMS Gold Survey 2018, THOMSON REUTERS, http://images.financial-risk-
solutions.thomsonreuters.info/Web/ThomsonReutersFinancialRisk/%7B87eb3342-8e48-
44af-937e-7ad3264c2199%7D_Gold_Survey_2018_Final_Version_-_GS18_-_Compressed-
min.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2019).  
 6. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, BRITISH PETROLEUM, https://www. 
bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/ 
statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2019-full-report.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2019) 
[hereinafter BP Energy Stats]; See, Katy Marriott, The ‘Second Scramble’ for Africa, 
GEOGRAPHICAL (Nov. 20, 2014), http://geographical.co.uk/geopolitics/geopolitics/item/411-
african-land-grab; Shantikumar V. Nair, The Second Scramble For Africa, HUFFPOST (Sept. 
29, 2015),  https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-second-scramble-for-africa_b_8216990; The 
New Scramble for Africa, THE ECONOMIST (May 7, 2019), https://www.economist.com/ 
leaders/2019/03/07/the-new-scramble-for-africa.  
 7. See Elizabeth Asiedu, Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The Role of Natural 
Resources, Market Size, Government Policy, Institutions and Political Instability, WORLD 
ECONOMY (Jan. 10, 2006) https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1467-
9701.2006.00758.x. 
 8. Africa Rising – The Hopeful Continent, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 3, 2011), https:// 
www.economist.com/leaders/2011/12/03/africa-rising; see also Sibusiso Sgwane, Africa Is 
Not A Hopeless Continent, HUFFPOST (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/africa-
is-not-a-hopeless_b_9166084; Fareed Zakaria, Major World Economies Are Becoming 
Increasingly Isolationist. Except Those In Africa, THE WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2019), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/major-world-economies-are-becoming-increasingly-
isolationist-except-those-in-africa/2019/08/29/5501ec28-ca9d-11e9-a4f3-c081a126de70_ 
story.html.  
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A deeper dive into the issues above is discussed in this comment, and 
broken down into four parts. Part I explores the history, discovery and 
scope of Africa’s massive oil reserves, focusing on the largest oil producers 
in Sub Saharan Africa (“SSA”), a group made up of the top five African 
countries, which cumulatively contribute to around 70% of current oil 
production within Africa.
9
  
Part II delves into the nature of the undertakings of the world’s largest oil 
consumers in Africa, through International Oil Companies (“IOC”). Special 
focus will be on the United States and China, which together accounts for 
about 33% of the world’s total oil consumption.10  
Part III analyzes the misuse of investments and natural resource revenues 
in Africa. Specifically, this comment addresses the different types of 
corruptions, and African’s perception of its wide spread nature. 
Furthermore, part III will link the battle for oil with the different vehicles of 
corruption used by Africa’s leaders, and the consequences of corruption on 
Africa’s economy like the deepening divide in Africa’s socio-economic 
sphere. 
Finally, Part IV unveils proposed solutions to combat corruptions. 
Initiatives such as the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and 
resolutions like UN Convention Against Corruption provide some ways to 
tackle the pandemic effect corruption has on the economy. Other solutions 
include leadership change, global corporate regulations and judicial 
accountability. These are avenues Africans could use to curtail the spread of 
corruption, and suppress the rapacious appetite of Africa’s leaders.   
Although this article is mainly focused on Africa, this paper will also 
examine the implications of Africa’s oil industry practices in the American 
economy.  Many African economies have a near total dependency on oil, 
thus any change in the oil industry, whether good or bad, inevitably 
reverberates not only to other industries, but also to other nations.  This is 
why addressing corruption in Africa’s oil and gas industry is especially 
important.  
Although there are different articles on corruption in Africa, or African 
oil industry, there is a dearth of research papers with an in-depth discussion 
of how the two are linked, or the varied ways corruption is promulgated. 
Transparency in the oil industry is crucial because different IOCs transfer 
                                                                                                             
 9. BP Energy Stats, supra note 6, at 16.  
 10. Id.; see also What Countries Are the Top Producers and Consumers of Oil?, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,  https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=709&t=6 (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2019). 
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funds to host governments in exchange for doing business in the host 
country. These funds should benefit the host country’s inhabitants and 
propel economic development; however, this does not appear to be the case 
in Africa. This phenomenon is aptly known as the ‘oil curse’ where 
resource rich countries, are performing worse than their counterparts.   
Thus, this paper overall brings a much-needed outlook on the battle for oil, 
and fighting through corruption in Africa’s socio-economic landscape.  
II. History, Discovery & Scope Of African Oil Reserves 
To fully understand the pervasiveness of corruption in many of Africa’s 
oil rich countries, one must revisit the history and scope of oil in Africa.  
The focus of this article is on the top oil producing countries in SSA such as 
Nigeria, Angola, Algeria.
11
 Although these countries share similarities in 
their approaches to oil governance, each country continues to grapple with 
its own unique set of challenges. Oil, for the purpose of this paper, includes 
shale oil, crude oil, condensates and natural gas liquids.  
A. Identifying Africa’s Largest Oil Producers 
1. Nigeria 
Nigeria is the largest oil and gas producer in SSA.
12
  In 1956, inside 
Nigeria’s Bayelsa state, Shell-BP discovered oil in commercial quantities at 
Oloibiri field.
13
 The discovery catapulted Nigeria into the oil industry, and 
ended its agricultural-based economy. Shortly after, in 1958, the Oloibiri 
field came on stream and began producing 5,100 barrels per day.
14
 In 1960, 
Nigeria extended to other foreign nations the exploration rights to adjoining 
states.
15
 And more than a decade after the first oil production, Nigeria 
became a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (“OPEC”) in 1971.  
                                                                                                             
 11. BP Energy Stats, supra note 6, at 16. 
 12. Nigeria, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (May 23, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/beta/ 
international/analysis.php?iso=NGA.   
 13. History of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry, NIGERIAN NAT’L PETROLEUM CO.,  
https://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPC-Business/Business-Information/Pages/Industry-
History.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
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Nigeria is known for its light and “sweet” (low sulfur) high grade quality 
of oil.
16
 The country “produces probably the best quality of crude in 
abundance . . . .”17 A lower level of sulfur in crude oil makes the oil cheaper 
and easier to refine, when compared with oil found in the Middle East, 
which may be “sticky.”18 Sticky oil is a characteristically viscous class of 
oil found in medium to heavy crudes.
19
  
Nigeria’s trade partners are largely in Europe and Asia.20 The United 
States, once Nigeria’s largest oil importer, no longer needed Nigerian oil 
after it discovered an abundance of shale oil in its own backyard.
21
 
Nigeria’s economy is largely dependent on oil, with crude oil accounting 
for 76% of exports in 2017.
22
 Surpassing its initial production, Nigeria 
produced around 672 million barrels in 2017, and currently has 
approximately around 30.1 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, with 30% 
located on shore, and 70% offshore.
23
  
Nigeria’s oil production and capacity may paint a thriving economic 
picture, but the country is not without its woes. The Oloibiri oil discovery 
has been both a blessing and a curse. Although Nigeria’s 2017 oil exports 
made it the 49
th
 largest export economy in the world, militant attacks and 
various forms of corruption, all contributed to Nigeria’s rank as the 124th of 
126 most complex economy.
24
 An economy that is too complex to navigate 
is a deterrent for foreign investment.  Different forms of corruption such as 
oil theft, infrastructure sabotage, and bribery are part of the various 
challenges surrounding Nigeria’s business climate that contribute to the 
                                                                                                             
 16. Africa’s Oil & Gas Scene After the Boom: What Lies Ahead, OXFORD ENERGY 
FORUM, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/OEF-117.pdf? 
v=7516fd43adaa, (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) [hereinafter Oxford Energy Forum].  
 17. Id. at 10.  
 18. Chris Nwachukwu Okeke, The Second Scramble for Africa’s Oil and Mineral 
resources: Blessing or Curse, 42 INT’L LAW 193, 200 (2008) [hereinafter, CN Okeke]. 
 19. See Types of Crude Oil, U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY,  https://www.epa.gov/ 
emergency-response/types-crude-oil (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).  
 20. .Where Does Nigeria Export Crude Petroleum to? (2017), THE OBSERVATORY OF 
ECON. COMPLEXITY, https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/nga/show/2709/ 
2017/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
 21. Oxford Energy Forum, supra note 16, at 13.  
 22. Nigeria, THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY,  https://oec.world/en/profile/ 
country/nga/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) [hereinafter OEC Nigeria].  
 23. Oil and Gas State of Play, DELOITTE, (Nov. 2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/ 
content/dam/Deloitte/xe/Documents/energy-resources/africa_oil_gas_state_of_play_Nov 
2018.pdf [hereinafter Deloitte State of Play]. 
 24. See OEC Nigeria, supra note 22.   
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nature of Nigeria’s complex economy.25 The last major foreign direct 
investment in Nigeria was in 2014.
26
 The volatile oil industry, aging oil 
fields along with the scarcity of new FDI has exacerbated the steady decline 
of Nigeria’s resources, falling 15% between 2010-17. 27 
2. Angola 
Angola is SSA’s second-largest oil producer.28 In 1955, Angola 
discovered oil in its Kwanza (Cuanza) Basin.
29
 Similarly to Nigeria, Angola 
also produces a ‘sweet’ quality of oil, and is a member of OPEC.30 Angola 
has approximately 17.6 billion barrels of oil resources, with 95% located 
offshore, and many more offshore and deep-water oil projects slated to 
commence in the upcoming decade.
31
  
China, India, and the United States are the top trading importers of 
Angola’s crude oil.32 China accounts for 67%, India 11%, and the U.S. 
8.3%.
33
 Angola’s upstream sector, which mainly deals with exploration and 
production activities, dominates Angola’s oil and gas industry, but its 
refining capacity in the midstream sector severely lags behind in consumer 
demand. Angola only has one refinery facility in Luanda with a capacity of 
65,000 barrels per day, however, it currently produces fewer than 40,000 
barrels per day.
34
 Furthermore, Angola’s top import in 2017 was refined 
petroleum, indicative of Angola’s lack of refinery infrastructures. 35  
It is unsurprising that Angola is also an oil-dependent economy, and thus 
highly susceptible to oil price fluctuations. Much like its other SSA oil 
                                                                                                             
 25. See Oxford Energy Forum, supra note 16.  
 26. Deloitte State of Play, supra note 23.  
 27. Id.  
 28. Angola – Oil and Gas, EXPORT.GOV, (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.export. 
gov/article?id=Angola-Oil-and-Gas.  
 29. Background Reference: Angola, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 7, 2019), 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Angola/background
.htm [hereinafter EIA Angola]. 
 30. EXPORT.GOV, supra note 30; see also, Angola Facts and Figures, ORG. OF THE 
PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/147.htm 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019) [hereinafter OPEC Angola].  
 31. Deloitte State of Play, supra note 23; EIA Angola, supra note 28.   
 32. EIA Angola, supra note 28. 
 33. Where Does Angola Export Crude Oil to?, THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. 
COMPLEXITY, https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/ago/show/2709/2017/ 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019).  
 34. Deloitte State of Play, supra note 23. 
 35. See Angola, THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY, https://oec.world/en/ 
profile/country/ago/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) [hereinafter OEC Angola]. 
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producing counterparts, Angola’s economy was impacted by the 2014 oil 
crash, when the price of oil nosedived from a peak of $115 in June 2014 to 
a record low of $35 per barrel in February 2016.
36
 With crude petroleum 
accounting for a bulk of its exports,
37
 a negative slew of consequences, 
most notably, a lack of new FDI, flowed from the oil bust.
38
 Because oil 
prices were discouragingly cheap, oil companies were not inclined to invest 
in Angola’s oil and gas (“O&G”) industry.  
The Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis de Angola (“Sonangol”) is 
Angola’s powerful state-owned oil company.39 Sonangol is likely a key 
reason IOCs are hesitant to invest in Angola’s oil industry.40 Created in 
1976, Sonangol controls Angola’s O&G sector.41 In November of 2017, 
Joao Lourenco displaced Jose Filomeno Dos Santos as president. Dos 
Santos  held the presidency for thirty-eight years.
42
 Sonangol’s previous 
governance contributed to Angola’s 2017 ranking as the 117th most 
complex economy. 
43
 Under the new governance by Lourenco, Sonangol 
underwent major leadership change.
44
 Lourenco removed different relatives 
and subordinates of Dos Santos from key positions of power in an attempt 
to control the corruption and nepotism that had permeated Angola’s 
government.
45
 For example, Lourenco replaced Zenu Dos Santos from his 
position as the head of Sonangol.
46
 Shortly after his displacement, Zenu was 
charged with corruption when he attempted to transfer $1.5 billion to a 
Swiss bank account. The money purportedly was part of a scheme to cover 
up fraudulent investment decisions.
47
 
  
                                                                                                             
 36. Kenneth Rogoff, What’s Behind the Drop in Oil Prices?, WORLD ECON. FORUM, 
(Mar. 2, 2016) https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/03/what-s-behind-the-drop-in-oil-
prices/.  
 37. OEC Angola, supra note 35. 
 38. Deloitte State of Play, supra note 23. 
 39. Sonangol E.P., INST. OF EXP. & INT’L TRADE, http://www.angola.doingbusiness 
guide.co.uk/market-experts/sonangol-ep/, (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
 40. Id.  
 41. See Oxford Energy Forum, supra note 16.  
 42. Antonio Cascais, Angola: The Fall of the Dos Santos Clan, DEUTSCHE WELLE, 
https://www.dw.com/en/angola-the-fall-of-the-dos-santos-clan/a-45646757 (last visited Oct. 
20, 2019). 
 43. OEC Angola, supra note 35. 
 44. Oxford Energy Forum, supra note 16. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  
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3. Algeria 
Right on Angola’s heel is Algeria, another SSA key player. Algeria 
commercially discovered oil in 1956 through the Edjelleh and Hassi 
Messaoud oil fields.
48
 Territorially, Algeria is the largest country in Africa 
and has been OPEC’s largest member country, since joining in 1969.49 
Algeria’s estimated 12.2 billion barrel of crude oil reserves, and six current 
active refineries, contributed to the country’s ability to produce 618,000 
barrels per day in 2018. 
50
  
Like its counterparts, Algeria is an oil-dependent economy because the 
country relies heavily on hydrocarbon production revenue.
51
 Petroleum gas 
(42%), crude petroleum (34%), and refined petroleum (18%) all make up 
Algeria’s top three 2017 exports, effectively making the O&G industry 
Algeria’s economic backbone.52 Trading destinations for Algeria’s exports 
are Europe and Eurasia (57%), Western Hemisphere (21%) and Asia-
Pacific regions (21%).
53
  
Although Algeria is currently experiencing production stagnation, this 
region still has huge potential. Perhaps due to the Algeria’s massive 
landmass, around two-thirds of prospective acreage is still underexplored or 
unexplored.
54
  
Sonatrach, Algeria’s state-owned hydrocarbon company, is the largest 
company in Africa and controls around 80% of hydrocarbon production.
55
 
Given the amount of underexplored areas in Algeria, Sonatrach has 
announced a focus on exploration and production activities of the upstream 
sector, which hopefully should also bolster new FDI for the country.
56
 
                                                                                                             
 48. Algeria Facts and Figures, ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, https:// 
www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/146.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) [hereinafter 
OPEC Algeria].  
 49. Id. 
 50. Algeria Executive Summary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (Mar. 25, 2019), 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=DZA [hereinafter EIA Algeria]. 
 51. Id.   
 52. Algeria, THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY, https://oec.world/en/profile/ 
country/dza/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) [hereinafter OEC Algeria]; see also OPEC Algeria, 
supra note 50.  
 53. EIA Algeria, supra note 50.  
 54. Why Algeria?, ALGERIA OIL & GAS SUMMIT 2019,  https://www.algeria-summit.com 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019).  
 55. Algeria –  Oil and Gas – Hydrocarbons, INT’L TRADE ADMIN. (Jan. 31, 2019),  
https://www.trade.gov/knowledge-product/algeria-oil-and-gas-hydrocarbons.  
 56. Id.   
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4. Other Players 
Apart from the top three oil producing countries in Africa, there are 
many other established and rising players. For example, Egypt is the largest 
producer of oil in Africa outside of OPEC, and Egypt boasts a long history 
of involvement in Africa’s O&G industry. 57 Egypt’s key location in Africa, 
plays a vital role in the transportation of oil and other resources between 
continents.
58
 “The Suez Canal is an important transit route for oil and 
liquified natural gas (LNG) shipment traveling northbound from the Persian 
Gulf to Europe and North America, and for shipment traveling southbound 
from North Africa and from countries along the Mediterranean Sea to 
Asia.”59 
Further examples include Libya, which lies east of Egypt. Libya holds 
Africa’s largest crude oil reserves, which currently accounts for 38% of the 
continent’s total.60 Many of these players are still battling with their own 
struggles. For example, Egypt’s oil consumption severely outpaces its oil 
production.
61
 This gap is partly due to aging oil fields, inadequate 
infrastructure and a lack of new oil discoveries.
62
 Libya, on the other hand, 
is ridden with civil unrest and a tumultuous trading relationship with the 
United States.
63
  
II. Undertakings of the World’s Largest Oil Consumers in Africa  
The world undeniably has a need for oil. Many by-products from crude 
oil such as gasoline, diesel fuel, heating oil, and jet fuel, are used as energy 
to fuel our daily lives.
64
 In this context, perhaps it is not surprising that the 
world’s largest oil consumers are the United States and China, who 
                                                                                                             
 57. Egypt Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/ 
beta/international/analysis.php?iso=EGY [hereinafter EIA Egypt] 
 58. Id.   
 59. Id.   
 60. Libya Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.eia. 
gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=LBY (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) [hereinafter EIA 
Libya].  
 61. EIA Egypt, supra note 57.   
 62. Id.   
 63. EIA Libya supra note 60.  
 64. Oil: Crude and Petroleum Products Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., (May 
23, 2019),      https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/ (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2019) (illustrating that crude oil by-products are used to fuel airplanes, cars, trucks, 
and heat homes etc.)  
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cumulatively account for 33% of the world’s total oil consumption.65 
China’s 1.44 billion inhabitants represents 19% of the world’s population 
according to the latest United Nations survey.
66
 The United States, though 
nowhere near as populous as China, has an extraordinary high use of 
petroleum products from crude oil. Petroleum remains the biggest U.S. 
energy source. “In 2018, U.S. petroleum consumption averaged about 20.50 
million barrels per day (b/d), which included about 1.2 million b/d of 
biofuels.”67 Specifically, in the petroleum product sector, consumption of 
motor gasoline accounted for 45%.
68
 Given the large demand for oil, the 
United States (historically), and China (more recently) have spearheaded 
multiple FDI projects in Africa.  
A. The Role of FDI and International Oil Companies  
The concept of foreign direct investments is fairly common.  “Foreign 
direct investment is when a company owns another company in a different 
country . . . [w]ith FDI, foreign companies are directly involved with day-
to-day operations in the other country.”69 In terms of FDI inflow to Africa, 
the continent still has a long way to go, because when compared with the 
rest of the world, Africa’s FDI lags.70 Nevertheless, according to the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), through 
2017, the United States is the third largest investor in Africa (preceded by 
France and Netherlands), while China is the fifth largest investor in 
Africa.
71
  
Economists and scholars have advanced different theories behind what 
drives FDI inflows to Africa. One theory combines three factors: 
Ownership, Location, and Internalization.
72
 Ownership answers the “why” 
                                                                                                             
 65. What Countries Are the Top Producers and Consumers of Oil?, supra note 10.  
 66. Population, UNITED NATIONS https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/popula 
tion/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).  
 67. Oil: Crude and Petroleum Products Explained - Use of Oil, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., (Oct. 3, 2019),      https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products 
/use-of-oil.php (last visited April. 26, 2020).  
 68. Id.  
 69. What is Foreign Direct Investment?, ECONOMY, https://www.ecnmy.org/learn/your-
world/globalization/foreign-direct-investment/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).  
 70. Edward Marandu, et al., An Analysis of Trends in Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 
to Africa, 10 INT’L J. BUS. ADMIN. 20, 29 (2018) [hereinafter Marandu FDI Trend].  
 71. Foreign Direct Investment to Africa Defies Global Slump, Rises 11% , UNITED 
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, https://unctad.org/en/pages/ 
newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=2109 (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).  
 72. Marandu FDI Trend, supra note 70, at 20.  
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question, and speaks to the benefit a corporation gets by owning a special 
asset like a brand or technical knowledge.
73
 Location answers the “where” 
question, and addresses the advantage one gets from setting economic 
activities in a place due to natural characteristics.
74
 Finally, internalization 
determines the “how” question, and is the benefit a corporation gets from 
undertaking a business activity in-house, instead of leaving it to the 
market.
75
 Together, these three factors  make it desirable to undertake FDI, 
and as such, it is not surprising that much of Africa’s  FDI is concentrated 
in resource-rich countries, and located primarily in the extractive sector.
76
 
In Africa, the top five oil producing countries on average account for 47% 
of the FDI inflow from 1990 – 2016.77 Historically, extractive sectors are 
the main recipients of FDI, with oil and petroleum as the main drivers.  
Recently, other sectors like tertiary services have gained increasing 
importance in the flow of FDI.
78
  
1. China  
Though China is the fifth largest investor in Africa, it has not always 
been so. China’s aggressive move into Africa was due to China’s 
unprecedented demand for oil, combined with the global response to the 
9/11 attack on the United States.
79
 The attack prompted China to re-
evaluate its dependence in the Middle East for oil (nearly 60% in 2001) by 
looking for outside sources.
80
 China’s frontrunners into Africa were IOCs, 
namely China National Petroleum Corporation (“CNPC”) and Sinopec.81 
Sinopec is a state-owned oil and gas company and was ranked second in 
2019 Fortune Global 500 list, while CNPC, also a state-owned corporation, 
was ranked 4
th
 on the list.
82
 Thus, China’s foreign policy in Africa is largely 
shaped by its IOC’s actions in deal making.  
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China’s entrance into Africa was not altruistic, yet it’s entrance into 
Africa was positively received by many of the continent’s leaders, partly 
because China’s entrance coincided with African leader’s business 
objectives. For example, China’s interest in Nigeria’s aligned with 
Nigeria’s then president, Olusegun Obasanjo’, “Look-East policy.”83 The 
Look-East policy signified the start of the alliance between Africa and Asia. 
84
The inception of the Look-East policy resulted from the reports that 
Western companies unfairly mistreated Nigerian companies.  
Because China’s renewed venture into Africa is for oil exploitation, its 
impact is concentrated in Africa’s largest oil-producing countries. However, 
China continues to build a diplomatic relationship with the rest of Africa as 
well. This renewed interest is marked with the creation of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (“FOCAC”), which is an avenue that reflects 
China’s foreign policy in Africa.85 FOCAC meetings are held every three 
years, and the first of these meetings was held in Beijing on October, 2000. 
86
 Over 800 officials from both China and 44 African countries attended the 
first meeting.
87
 The next meeting in 2003, was held in Ethiopia, and 
attended by more than 70 government ministers from China, and 44 African 
countries.  
The China-Africa meetings were concomitant with different trade deals.  
For example, key outcomes from the 2006 FOCAC meeting was the 
establishment of China-Africa Development Fund, a deal valued at $5 
billion, to encourage further Chinese investments in Africa.
88
 Because 
China was a late entry in Africa’s oil trade, China had to be creative in its 
approach by offering unique benefits not already provided by its western 
counterparts.  For example, other China trade deals with Africa targeted 
debt relief, political “non-interference” approach in Africa’s internal 
policies, support for Africa in global forums, and competitive military deals 
etc.
89
 These deals and negotiations contributed to the notion that China 
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viewed African countries as peers, and not as nations incapable of self-
governance.   
Unsurprisingly, most China and Africa trade relationship are oil-backed 
transactions. For instance, in 2004, Angola delivered to China 10,000 
barrels per day of crude oil in exchange for Chinese loan in the amount of 
$2 billion repayable over 17 years at a low 1.5% interest rate.
90
 In 2005, 
China’s Ex-Im Bank agreed to help finance Nigeria’s construction of power 
stations for approximately $300 million, and in exchange, CNPC secured a 
deal to purchase 30,000 barrels of crude oil a day for one year.
91
 Many of 
the China-Africa deals involve infrastructure agreements, and the 
infrastructure construction has contributed to China’s influence in Africa in 
both diplomatic and political operations. 
92
 “China’s role on the African 
continent has been defined by the financing of more than 3,000, largely 
critical, infrastructure projects.” 93 
China’s overall trade relationship with Africa stands in stark contrast to 
that of United States. “China [does] not view itself as superior but rather as 
a partner.”94 In contrast, many have criticized the U.S. relationship with 
Africa for its interventionist approach.
95
 And others have noted that the 
U.S. views Africa as a continent in need of saving and thus the U.S. trade 
deals with Africa comes with political and/or economic conditions.
96
 “The 
West introduced stringent conditionalities in economic cooperation among 
nations in order to realize their objective.” 97 China’s hands-off approach in 
Africa’s internal affairs, likely indicates that China is not supporting many 
of Africa’s corrupt government regime.98 
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China’s involvement with Africa is however, not without its criticisms. 
Because China’s FDI in Africa is centered in Africa’s top oil producing 
countries, and most notably in the extractive sectors, there are different 
environmental implications. Chinese oil companies are not bound by the 
same environmental restrictions as the United States, therefore, China could 
comparatively give less concern to environmental implications. The 
international community have continuously raised concerns about China’s 
inadvertent contribution to human rights issues, poor labor conditions, and 
environmental degradation.
99
 Even China’s debt relief program in Africa is 
under attack leading many countries to question its sustainability and its 
potential crippling effects.
100
 Despite these criticisms however, there is no 
doubt that China’s involvement in Africa through its FDI programs 
indicates a long-term commitment to the continent.  
2. The United States of America  
United States’ interest in Africa is complex. To fully understand U.S. 
relationship with Africa, a separate look at this country’s interesting history 
with oil and foreign policy in the global stage is warranted. The U.S. first 
experienced the black gold rush in the mid 1800s at the time of the 
industrial revolution.
101
 Though coal was initially the main source of 
energy, tables inevitably turned with the extraction of oil in Pennsylvania in 
1861, and the U.S. first exported shipment to London.
102
 With more than 
200 by products of oil in the market by the early 1900s, U.S. established its 
prowess and was responsible for more than 85% of the world’s crude oil 
production.
103
  Henry Ford’s invention of Model T car in 1908, and the 
beginning of World War I and II further promulgated U.S. oil production.
104
 
Domestically, Americans consumed refined motor fuel, while 
internationally, oil fueled ships, land vehicles, and  planes  provided an 
energy source for warfare.
105
 “Oil thus became a key component in the 
exercise of American hegemony over a relatively prosperous world order, 
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after an era in which an unstable balance of power produced two world 
wars sandwiched around a global depression.” 106 
However, though the U.S. commanded most of the world’s crude oil 
production, the combination of America’s massive domestic demand, war 
supply demand, and bleak survey reports of U.S. remaining oil supplies, 
triggered American oil security fears, and prompted the United States to 
look to outside sources for oil.
107
 “In 1947, the United States became a net-
importer of oil for the first time.” 108 Further threatening America’s 
dominance in oil production and oil security fear, were discoveries of oil in 
other areas of the world, most notably, Saudi Arabia.
109
  
The discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia, and other Arab nations were 
indicative of U.S. foreign policy centered on securing its oil future. “[W]ith 
concerns growing about the diminishing U.S. oil production capacity, 
President Franklin Roosevelt declare[d] Saudi oil vital to U.S. security and 
provide[d] financial support.” 110 The U.S. also aided in Iran’s effort in 
1953 to overthrow then Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq.
111
And just a 
year later, the new Iranian government agreed to an arrangement where 
mainly U.S. companies managed Iran’s oil industry. 112 
The combination of multiple oil discoveries along with U.S. massive 
domestic oil production caused a proliferation of oil in the markets. 
Because of the overabundance of oil, the U.S. slashed oil prices and created 
import caps to better control oil prices.
113
 However, this move only 
protected U.S. markets, and Arab nations that depended heavily on oil 
revenue were left with growing frustrations. This led to the creation of 
OPEC.
114
 Though OPEC gained little attention at its inception, the 
organization quickly expanded to include not only Arab nations, but other 
African countries as well. The growth in OPEC size contributed to its 
power and control of world’s oil market. “By the end of 1970s, 
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international oil companies [had] unfettered access to just 7 percent of the 
world’s oil reserves, down from 85 percent in the 1960s.” 115  
Further display of OPEC’s power and exposure of U.S. fragility in the oil 
industry occurred with the 1973 oil embargo, after the U.S. supported Israel 
in the Yom Kippur War.
116
  Arab nations retaliated against the U.S. by 
blocking oil shipments. “More than the embargo itself, however, U.S. 
policy and consumer responses to it created ‘panic at the pump’ and 
inflamed the crisis at home.”117 The oil shortage in this period caused an 
increase in crude oil prices, which sparked U.S. drilling explorations in 
foreign nations such as West Africa.
118
 Thus, this period coincided with 
many oil discoveries made in Africa. Years later, with the 9/11 attack on 
U.S. soil, U.S. sought to reduce its dependence on Middle Eastern oil, and 
protect against supply disruptions. “[T]he U.S. Department of Defense 
established a new unified Africa Command to safeguard growing oil 
production in West Africa and counter Chinese design[s] on African 
mineral resources.”119 
Today, U.S.–Africa trade and investment relationship are centered on the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (“AGOA”).120 The Act, renewed in 
2015 to extend through 2025,
121
 gives exports from countries in SSA 
preferential access to U.S. markets. 
122
 AGOA currently has forty 
participating African countries.
123
 For African countries to receive AGOA 
benefits however, compliance with certain pre-set condition are necessary. 
For example, “[t]he country must be making progress toward a market-
based economy, . . . elimination of trade barriers and systems to combat 
corruption, and protection of worker’s rights.” 124 Furthermore, “AGOA has 
had a mixed legacy, given its goal of growing Africa’s export markets 
rather than building two-way trade and investment partnerships.”125 Also, 
crude petroleum remains the dominant product traded between the U.S. and 
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Africa “with 69 percent share of overall AGOA imports.”126 Thus, because 
of the limited concentration of trade, very few countries and sectors in 
Africa are able to meaningfully utilize the benefits of AGOA as a whole.  
Trade between the U.S. and Africa has undergone a significant change in 
recent years due to the discovery of shale oil in the U.S. As a result of the 
oil discovery, the U.S. lifted a 40-year oil export ban put in place in the 
1970s, after OPEC’s oil embargo against the U.S.127  Not long after, the 
U.S. reclaimed its once lost independence and dominance in the oil 
industry.
128
 After the U.S. mass production of shale, U.S. crude oil imports 
from Africa took a significant plunge. “Crude oil exports from Africa to the 
United States have fallen from a high of 2.4 million barrels a day in 2007 to 
0.29 million barrels a day in 2014, which represents an 87.7 percent 
decline.”129 The impact of the shale oil discovery and subsequent reduction 
in Africa’s oil export to the U.S. has reverberated in Africa’s oil-dependent 
economy. Though China and other countries have filled the gaping hole the 
U.S. left, many African countries are still in search of a stable customer 
base.
130
 
Despite the reduction in African crude oil imports to the U.S., America’s 
investments in Africa are still significant. For example, U.S. FDI in 2017 
alone was $5.8 billion in Nigeria and $1.7 billion in Ghana.
131
 Although a 
lion chunk of America’s reduction of trade and investment in Africa is due 
to shale energy boom, another underlying and long recurring reason is the 
constant battle against corruption in Africa’s economy.  
III. Corruption and Misuse of Investment 
and Natural Resource Revenues In Africa  
Although one would naturally expect the benefits of foreign investments 
and revenue from Africa’s massive oil reserves to flow down to its 
inhabitants, history indicates otherwise.  Thus, there is a growing 
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resentment of many African citizens against government leadership. 
“According to some estimates, . . . Africa is the only world region where 
sustained economic growth in the coming years will not result in 
meaningful poverty reduction; on the contrary, poverty is projected to rise.” 
132
 And corruption continues to impede the efforts of bringing Africa out of 
poverty.  
According to the Corruption Perception Index (“CPI”), a leading global 
indicator of public sector corruption, countries in SSA displayed the highest 
levels of corruption.
133
 The CPI included rankings for 180 of the 195 
countries in the world.
134
 On the list, Libya ranked 170 out of 180, Angola 
ranked 166 out of 180, Nigeria ranked 144 out of 180, while Algeria and 
Egypt tied for 105th out of 180 countries.  
The pervasive nature of corruption in Africa has affected the public 
perception on the possibilities for its eradication. Afrobarometer, a non-
partisan research network, conducted a public attitude survey on corruption 
with a nationally represented survey sample of African citizens.
135
 Thirty-
six African countries were surveyed and key findings revealed that indeed 
Africans are not oblivious to the wide-spread corruption that has become a 
part of everyday life.
136
The most popular reason why people do not report 
corruption was “fear of the consequences (34%) and the expectation that 
nothing will be done (14%).
137
  
Further, many responders of the Afrobarometer surveys show corruption 
has increased, and, among the types of elected or state officials viewed to 
be corrupt, the police were most often cited.
138
 For instance, “45% of 
respondents say ‘most’ or ‘all’ police are involved in corruption… 
government officials (38%) . . . judges and magistrates (34%), . . . officials 
in the Presidency (31%) . . . .” 139 
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African countries’ rankings and survey reports indicate the breadth and 
scope of corruption and shows that urgent change is necessary to set the 
African economy back on the correct course. Indeed, even though most of 
corruption is unreported, a majority of Africans (54%) still believe that 
ordinary people can fight corruption.
140
  
A. Corruption Overview  
There are many different definitions of corruptions. Because of 
corruption’s wide scope, one definition does not seem to fully capture its 
essence. For example, Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines corruption as a 
“dishonest or illegal behavior especially by powerful people.”141 
Transparency International, a leading independent, non-governmental 
organization that created the CPI, defines corruption as “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain.” 142 The United Nations defined 
corruption as an “insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects 
on societies.”143  Others have defined corruption to be “the diversion of 
public resources to non-public purposes.” 144 The reality is there are 
different varieties and typologies of corruption. And the impact of 
corruption not only “corrodes the social fabric of society,”145 it also creates 
a “distrustful and apathetic public.”146   
Scholars have advanced different theories on corruption, one of which 
includes four subtypes: (1) cost-reducing corruption; (2) cost-enhancing 
corruption; (3) benefit-reducing corruption; and (4) benefit-enhancing 
corruption.
147
 In all of these scenarios, corrupt individuals look for ways to 
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extract extra income for themselves. A cost-reducing type of corruption “is 
a specific scheme developed by business bureaucrats to enhance their 
ability to extract extralegal income from business enterprises”148 In this 
scheme, bureaucrats looks for ways to enhance and maximize its profits by 
reducing the cost of government activities on a particular enterprise.
149
 For 
example, the bureaucrat can “reduce or eliminate the tax owed the state by a 
business enterprise.”150  The bureaucrat rewards the civil servant doing the 
leg work, and the cost saved through the illegal tax scheme, is then shared 
among those who were involved.
151
  
Corruption in a cost-enhancing structure thrives where “there is excess 
demand for a public good or services and the government is unwilling or 
unable to increase supply.” 152 In this scenario, due to what is effectively a 
perpetual shortage, a corrupt individual will extort extra payments from the 
public seeking access to the goods or services.
153
 Another type of example 
on this structure is where bureaucrats illegally levy extra taxes on a 
person’s property.154 When the person is  unable to pay the extra taxes, the 
bureaucrat will seize the property for his personal use.
155
     
A benefit-enhancing corruption involves government agency transfer of 
resources to the public, through administered programs, i.e. scholarship 
funds.
156
  In this scheme, individuals who oversee these government 
programs can “illegally transfer more resources to a beneficiary than the 
[beneficiary] is entitled to receive.” 157 Here, the overseer profits by 
allowing the recipient to exaggerate his actual needs, allowing the two to 
share in the portion of the overpayment.
158
 
In a benefit-reducing corruption, “civil servants seeking ways to enrich 
themselves can illegally appropriate government benefits that are due other 
citizens and make them their own.
159
This type of corruption is quite 
pervasive in African countries.
160
 To use the scholarship fund scenario as an 
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example again, overseers of this program can delay the disbursement of the 
scholarship by placing the money in a local or foreign bank to bear interest, 
and then appropriate the interest earned for individual use.
161
 Similarly, “the 
head of a military battalion may steal some of the supplies and equipment 
allocated to his unit and sell them in the open market, and keep the 
proceeds for himself.”162  
B. Linking the Battle for Oil to the Different Vehicles of Corruption  
Within the different typologies of corruption, there are varied means by 
which corruption is carried out: money laundering, nepotism, bribery, abuse 
of power for private gain, patronage, siphoning of public funds, etc.
163
 The 
proliferation of these types of corruption did not occur overnight. 
Corruption was once so deeply ingrained in the fabric of society, that its 
existence was deemed perfectly normal and was just another facet of doing 
business. Today, this standard cannot continue to be the case.  
Corruption perpetuates poverty in Africa’s O&G industry, because many 
of the benefits derived from oil never trickle down to ordinary citizens. This 
is a reason why, despite the sheer amount of Africa’s natural resources, 
poverty is expected to rise.
164
 Instead, the oil revenues continue to enrich 
the so-called leaders and governmental actors. Thus, the elimination of 
corruption in Africa’s O&G industry must be targeted. Eradication of 
corruption in Africa’s oil industry if possible, will be noticeable in other 
sectors and other nations, because the economy of many African nation 
revolves around oil, and many African nations have international partners.  
The battle against corruption is not just limited to Africa. Developed 
countries and international companies with activities abroad also frequently 
play a role. In fact, corruption was openly supported through business 
practices. For example, “[p]rior to 1977 it was not unlawful for U.S. 
companies to offer bribes to secure foreign contracts.”165 Also, until 1999, 
certain “bribes paid abroad were technically tax deductible for German 
companies . . . .” 166 Even today, a large portion of the illicit money 
received by African government officials and leaders, “tend[s] to end up in 
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offshore accounts in countries such as Switzerland, or is invested in real 
property in the developed countries.” 167  
Over time, the U.S. and several European countries have implemented 
different programs meant to tackle corruption. For example, in 1977, 
Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), “making it 
unlawful for certain classes of persons and entities to make payments to 
foreign government officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business.”168 
In addition, Britain updated its Bribery Act in 2010, to enhance Britain’s 
law on bribery. The Bribery Act is “among the strictest legislation 
internationally on bribery.”169 This is partly because Britain’s Bribery Act 
employs a strict liability law.”170 As a result of this, on the day Britain 
implemented the Act, “stock prices fell for companies doing business in 
high-corruption countries . . . .”171 
Corruption acts and programs have had their fair share of successes. For 
example, in 2017 Halliburton agreed to pay a $29.2 million fine related to 
payments made to a local Angolan company in exchange for winning oil-
field contracts.
172
 In 2013, the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) charged Weatherford International, a Swiss-based oilfield service 
company, with bribery and inappropriate spending on foreign officials in 
order to win Middle East and African business.
173
  In 2010, Royal Dutch 
Shell was part of an SEC sweep to crack down on international public 
companies engaged in corruption abroad.
174
 Shell International Exploration 
and Production agreed to pay over $18 million when it violated the FCPA 
by making illegal payments to Nigerian Custom Services to gain 
preferential treatments related to its projects.
175
 Yet, despite SEC’s actions 
                                                                                                             
 167. Mbaku, supra note 144, at 722.  
 168. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).  
 169. The Bribery Act, TRANSPARENCY INT’L UK, https://www.transparency.org.uk/our-
work/business-integrity/bribery-act/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).  
 170. Id.  
 171. Rose Jacobs, How to Fight Corruption–And Why We Should, 
CHICAGOBOOTHREVIEW (May 20, 2019), https://review.chicagobooth.edu/economics/2019/ 
article/how-fight-corruption-and-why-we-should. 
 172. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC.AND EXCH. COMM’N https://www. 
sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).  
 173. Id.  
 174. SEC Charges Seven Oil Services and Freight Forwarding Companies for 
Widespread Bribery of Customs Officials, U.S. SEC.AND EXCH. COMM’N https://www.sec. 
gov/news/press/2010/2010-214.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).  
 175. Id.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss4/2
2020]  The Battle for Oil: Fighting Through Corruption 629 
 
 
to control corruption, the battle is far yet to be over. Different corruption 
scandals continue in Africa’s O&G industry, sometimes with multinational 
companies right at the center of it all.  
1. The OPL 245 Scandal—Shell, Eni, and JPMorgan Chase Bank  
Royal Dutch Shell, ranked third in the 2019 Fortune Global 500 list, is 
an international oil company that has established its dominance in 
production, exploration and refining of oil and other natural gases.
176
 Eni, 
an Italian company, is also an oil-producing supermajor with activities that 
includes exploration, refinery and marketing etc.
177
 JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
(“Chase”) is a financial institution headquartered in the U.S. with a history 
that spans over 200 years.
178
 Currently, Chase operates globally in more 
than 60 countries worldwide, including Nigeria. 
179
  
In 2018, JPMorgan Chase became involved in an ongoing, high-profile 
lawsuit along with Shell and Eni, over an oil block sale (“OPL 245”) in 
Nigeria made in 2011.
180
 The Nigerian government filed a lawsuit 
implicating Shell and Eni for perpetrating a scheme to pay over $1 billion 
for an offshore oil block license.
181
 Owners of the license will have 
authority for oil exploration and other activities in the area. The money 
allegedly never reached the Nigerian government.  “The companies agree 
the payment was made, but disagree[d] about whether those funds then 
went to bribes.”182 According to the Nigerian government, the oil block 
payment were instead made to Dan Etete, a convicted money launderer. 
“Internal Shell emails, leaked to the press in 2017, reveal that senior 
executives knew the massive payment for the oil block would go to 
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Etete . . . .”183 Not surprisingly, Nigeria then separately implicated Chase in 
the lawsuit for negligently carrying out the wire transfers.  
Shell and Eni paid the initial $1.1 billion to a Chase bank account in 
London, and soon after payments were made, Nigerian officials instructed 
Chase to transfer the money to a Swiss bank account.
184
 Chase transferred 
the money from its London branch, but the money was promptly returned, 
after the Swiss Bank cited compliance reasons due to the large amount.
185
 
Failing in its first attempt, Nigerian officials instructed Chase to send the 
money to a bank in Lebanon instead.
186
 The Lebanese bank also rejected the 
payment due to a suspicion that the transfer was a money laundering 
attempt.
187
 Finally, Chase was again instructed to transfer the money, this 
time back to Nigeria, and into bank accounts owned by Etete.
188
 The final 
transfer was successful.  
In the ongoing lawsuit, the Nigerian government claimed that the 
rejection of the prior transfers should have been a clear red flag deterring 
Chase from making the final transaction, regardless of what its instructions 
were.
189
 Indeed, Chase flagged the transfers as suspicious to British 
regulators, however, the British regulators warned Chase that though the 
transfers were approved by the British government, that did not mean that 
Chase would be “legally off the hook if problems with the transfers later 
arose . . . .”190 This lawsuit is currently ongoing in Italy, and if the verdict is 
favorable to Nigeria, the country will have the opportunity to appropriately 
utilize the lost oil revenues for its people.   
2. The Riggs Bank Scandal  
Another example of corruption that has plagued Africa’s O&G industry 
is illustrated by the Riggs Bank (“Riggs”) scandals that rocked the financial 
industry in the early 2000s. Riggs Bank, before its acquisition by the PNC 
Financial Services Group, operated out of Washington D.C., across the 
street from U.S. Treasury department, for more than 100 years.
191
 At its 
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prime, Riggs boasted an impressive clientele. “More than 20 U.S. 
Presidents (ranging from Lincoln to Nixon) banked at Riggs . . . .”192 
Eventually, Riggs Bank’s dubious dealings with questionable international 
political leaders, and its complacency in being a willing participant in fraud 
and money laundering led to the bank’s downfall.193  
Before Riggs’ financial decline, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo 
(“Obiang”), President of Equatorial Guinea (“E.G.”) for over forty years, 
opened different accounts at Riggs in 1995.
194
 E.G. is one of Africa’s rising 
players in the oil industry. Revenue from the O&G industry accounts for 
60% of E.G.’s GDP, and 86% of E.G.’s exports back in 2015.195 Obiang’s 
account with Riggs operated from 1995-2004 and amassed around $700 
million in oil revenues before its closing.
196
  
The oil revenues in Obiang’s account were likely deposited from 
different IOCs that invested in E.G. such as ExxonMobil, Chevron, and 
Marathon Oil.
197
 “President Obiang and his close relatives maintained 
signatory authority over many of the Riggs accounts and had complete 
discretion over the use of those funds.”198 It is highly doubtful that the 
money in Riggs account and others like it ever benefited the people of E.G.  
The SEC and the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation 
launched a full inquiry into Riggs’ activities in connection to the bank’s 
dealings with E.G. and other countries such as Chile, and Saudi Arabia.
199
 
In relation to Riggs dealings with E.G., the Senate investigation report 
showed the extent of the illicit use of the Riggs funds. Riggs assisted 
Obiang in opening up a shell company in the Bahamas, and Riggs accepted 
$3 million in cash deposits from the account.
200
 The Senate investigation 
report further revealed that Riggs had ignored the accusations of corruption 
and human rights violation within Obiang’s presidency. Instead, in a period 
of two years, Riggs accepted a total of $13 million in cash for E.G., in 
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“unopened plastic-wrapped bundles.”201 This action definitely aligns with 
SEC’s statement that indeed, one of “the most obvious form of corrupt 
payment is large amounts of cash.”202  
Furthermore, the Senate Investigation team also revealed that six IOC 
made significant payments to E.G. in the forms of scholarships.
203
 For 
example, Chevron Corporation provided $150,000 each year between 2001 
and 2004 for student training expenses; Hess made $1.9 million to fund 
E.G.’s students studying in U.S. and Canada; and from 2003 to 2007, 
Devon Energy paid $200,000 per year towards E.G.’s educational 
training.
204
 The total amount of scholarships made to E.G. amounted to over 
$4 million.
205
  
Whether any of the scholarship money or other funds from the Riggs 
accounts actually benefitted the people of E.G. given the unacceptable use 
of funds, is highly doubtful. For example, the reputation of President 
Obiang’s son, Teodorin Nguema Obiang (“Teodorin”), has been marred by 
different corruption scandals due to his ostentatious lifestyle funded by the 
oil revenue. Teodorin purchased luxury homes in multiple locations 
including South Africa and Los Angeles.
206
 Public records for the L.A. 
home showed that it was worth around $35 million.
207
  
Eventually, Riggs pleaded guilty to different criminal charges and 
violation of the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act and was fined $16 million.
208
 The 
$16 million fine was in addition to an earlier civil fine of $25 million, along 
with different requirements imposed by the U.S. Federal Reserved aimed at 
improving Riggs internal controls and risk management.
209
 After Riggs was 
acquired by PNC Financial group, its international work with political 
leaders was shut down, and its former headquarters went up for sale.
210
 The 
E.G. government on the other hand, is still struggling to be freed from the 
strong grip of corruption in its economy.   
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IV. Forward Looking View and Proposed Solutions to Combat Corruption  
Indeed, Africa has a plethora of resources and a huge potential for 
growth; however, until the spread of corruption is successfully contained, 
progress will lag. It is important to fight corruption because of its 
burdensome cost on the economy. The bottom line is that countries and 
companies engaged in corruption, pay more. The cost can be in the form of 
fines levied by the SEC or other regulatory bodies, or through delays by 
companies because of their increased caution in evaluating deals with 
corrupt countries, or it can be in the form of missing benefits for 
Africans.
211
 According to a 2015 report from the United Nations Economic 
Commissions for Africa, “African countries have lost more than $1 trillion 
in official payments since the 1970s through bribery of government 
officials . . . other illicit practices . . . .” 212 And more than 75% of the 
missing payment can be linked to some activities in the O&G sector. 
213
  
It is clear that corruption is a lose-lose scenario for all parties involved, 
thus combatting corruption should not be left to African nations alone. To 
tame this beast, all hands must be on deck, at the same time. As a result, 
proposed solutions to combat corruption are different depending on which 
actor is involved. Solutions can be viewed through the lenses of IOCs and 
multinational companies, partner countries, African youths, and judicial 
independence.  If one actor/side were to act alone, the effects of those 
actions would be minimal and would likely be counteracted by actions from 
other actors. Instead, there should be a collaborative effort by all parties in 
Africa’s O&G economy.  
A. Different Actors and Their Roles in Curtailing the Spread of Corruption 
1. International Oil Companies and Multinational Companies   
Connections between oil production and human rights abuses and 
corruption is not uncommon. For example, in  Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co, Ken Saro-Wiwa led a non-violent movement to protest the 
social and ecological effect of Shell’s activities in his Ogoni community in 
Nigeria. In response to the opposition, Shell allegedly aided the Nigerian 
police in military attacks to quell the opposition. In the end, Wiwa and his 
team were arrested, tortured, and ultimately hanged.
214
 Plaintiffs in the 
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Wiwa case were Nigerian emigres who were next of kin to the victims.
215
 
They sought damages from Shell under the Racketeering Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act, the Alien Torts Claims Act, and international 
law and treaties. 
216
 At the height of the controversy, Shell remained 
complacent and chose to be a bystander instead of intervening on behalf of 
Wiwa or his team, despite Shell’s huge influence in the Ogoni 
community.
217
 Implicit in the Wiwa complaints filed was that from the 
death of Wiwa and his team, Shell stood to benefit.  
First, in order for IOCs and multinational companies to fight corruptions 
and other cases like Wiwa, all companies must be more forthcoming and 
transparent with their overseas activities. Complacency is no longer an 
option. Corruption thrives in the dark, so the more light shed on companies’ 
international activities, the more likely its accountability. Second, 
companies should implement anti-corruption programs. And if such 
programs are already in place, the companies should publish their follow up 
mechanisms.
218
  
With regard to country transparency, a detailed country level disclosure 
from companies (IOCs in particular) for all their international activities will 
ensure clarity and honesty in the companies reported reveune.
219
 The more 
transparent IOCs are, the more African citizens will be able to hold their 
leaders accountable for the way oil revenues are being spent and disbursed. 
For example, President Obiang’s dictator-like governance survived off of 
oil riches from E.G. Additionally, the Riggs Scandal and the payments 
made to the Riggs account were misused for so long partly because of the 
lack of transparency.  
Disclosure is not just limited to revenues, but should also entail contract 
transparency as well. For example, the aforementioned ‘scholarship 
payments’ made to E.G. by national companies were all part of a contract 
those companies signed with the E.G. government.
220
 The extent of the use 
of the scholarship money as well as the names of students who benefited 
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should be available to the public to ensure that the money is not a front for 
bribes, because scholarship funds can easily be manipulated in a benefit-
enhancing or benefit-reducing type of corruption. 
221
 
To further this vision of transparency and disclosure, some IOCs are a 
member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (“EITI”). EITI 
was launched in 2002, and is the “global standard to promote the open and 
accountable management of oil, gas and mineral resources.”222 This means 
that EITI encourages disclosures of all oil and gas payments made to the 
government or received by government. EITI data covers the location of 
natural resources, from revenue collection, revenue allocation, and extends 
to the point where the revenues are converted to public benefit.
223
 So far, 52 
countries have implemented the EITI standard, including many of Africa’s 
largest O&G producers.
224
  
EITI’s main focus is the public access to information which would 
hopefully foster debate and discussion in the public sphere; however, there 
is still room for growth as some data required by the EITI could be 
expanded.
225
 According to Transparency International, a recommendation 
to combat corruption is for IOCs to have a more detailed disclosure 
(country by country) of operating reserves and production data, as well as 
income statements. 
226
 Providing this information should thoroughly 
address issues related to revenue transparency.  
Regarding the second point, IOCs and national companies should 
implement anti-corruption programs, and if already in place, progress made 
with such programs should be disclosed.
227
 Having an anticorruption 
program will ensure that combatting corruption is a primary goal of senior 
executives and employees in international companies. By actively 
maintaining an anti-corruption program, companies will be able to more 
accurately comply with their own standards.  The anti-corruption programs 
should not only include companies’ policy and stance on corruption, but 
should also include management systems created for reporting incidents.
228
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Performance and the number of reported incidents should also be monitored 
and evaluated by company leaders.  
Overall, the role IOCs and national companies play is crucial. “One of 
the most important foreign suppliers of corruption in the continent is the 
multinational company, which is seeking to influence public officials in 
order to have access to either government contract or conduct.”229  This is 
also evident via the various SEC takedowns of multinational companies 
who violated the FCPA. Thus, because of the crucial role IOCs and 
multinational companies play through their activities abroad, these 
companies’ full cooperation is needed in order to curtail the spread of 
corruption in Africa’s O&G industry.  
2. Partner Countries  
President Obiang wrote the following in his book: “discovery of oil in 
Equatorial Guinea . . . have completely changed the attitude of many of our 
partners . . . Suddenly, they have become more permissive.” 230 This quote 
is not the only indicator that partner countries are increasingly turning a 
blind eye to allegations of corruption and human right violations suspected 
of African leaders, due to the economies of the oil industry. Many accused 
violators elude justice by fleeing to neighboring African countries or 
international communities.   
The United Nations General Assembly recognized the dangers 
complacency in addressing corruption in partner countries poses, and thus 
formed the United Nations Convention against Corruption (“UN 
Convention”). The UN Convention was a “global response to a global 
problem” that was predicated on international consensus.231 The UN 
Convention’s treaty was enforceable in 2005 and as of 2019 included over 
180 participating countries known as State Parties.
232
 The treaty “addresses 
the cross-border nature of corruption with provisions on international 
cooperation and on the return of the proceeds of corruption.”233 The UN 
Convention addresses five main areas: cooperation at an international level, 
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asset recovery, preventative measures, technical assistance and information 
exchange. 
234
  
In addressing asset recovery measures, the UN Convention recognized 
the role that other particularly developed countries, have in inadvertently 
aiding the continuation of corruption. Often times, suspected corrupt 
leaders and human right violators who have looted their countries 
resources, ‘invest’ those resources in foreign economies. This investment is 
done either by buying assets in developed countries, or by storing their 
illicit gains in offshore accounts. “[M]any of the top-level African civil 
servants and political elites who engage in grand corruption in African 
countries often use the United States, the European Union, and various 
offshore banking locations (especially in Switzerland) as the preferred 
destination for their ill-gotten gains.”235 Furthermore, reports have shown 
that “as much as 30% of African financial wealth is estimated to be held 
offshore, costing an estimated $14bn (£10bn) in lost tax revenues every 
year.”236 The UN Convention recognized the role all countries play in 
fighting international corruption and thus included provisions for the 
extradition of suspected criminals and the return of looted assets. 
237
 
The UN Convention is a step in the right direction, however, it is not 
without its limitations. The UN Convention contains many non-mandatory 
provisions.
238
 These provisions, coupled with loose norms and terms, have 
resulted in the UN Convention’s restrained ability to influence the legal 
systems of its signatories.
239
 As a result, some countries are using the UN 
Convention as a way to avert criticism. By being a participating member of 
the UN Convention, countries placate the investor communities and others 
alike, while actually doing little to implement the UN Convention’s 
provisions.
240
 Implementing a higher level of scrutiny regarding each 
country’s review and implementation process against corruption may go a 
long way in correcting some of UN Convention’s weaknesses. 241 The 
bottom line is that there must be an effective sanction in place for those in 
                                                                                                             
 234. The UN Convention, supra note 143. 
 235. Mbaku, Fight Against Bureaucratic Corruption, supra note 144 at 715.  
 236. Anton du Plessis, Corruption in Africa Violate Human Rights. Why Do We Tolerate 
It? THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/ 
2016/sep/16/corruption-africa-violates-human-rights-fuels-radicalism-why-do-we-tolerate-it.  
 237. The UN Convention, supra note 143 at 30.  
 238. Hechler, et. al,, supra note 231 at 22-23.  
 239. Id. 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
638 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
  
 
violation of the UN Convention’s provisions to limit corruption in the 
international forum.   
International instruments alone, such as the UN Convention, will not 
suffice in combatting corruption issues in Africa. Neighboring partner 
countries in Africa also have their roles to play. In recognition of this, the 
Africa Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (“AU 
Convention”) was implemented in 2006. 242 The AU Convention listed 
concerns about the “negative effects of corruption and impunity on the 
political, economic, social and cultural stability of African States . . . .”243 
One of AU Convention’s objectives is to “prevent, detect, and punish, and 
eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and private sectors.” 
244
 In effect, the AU Convention criminalizes acts such as illicit enrichment, 
money laundering, foreign bribery, and urges transparency in the 
management and conduction of public affairs. 
245
 
Over 40 countries have ratified and consented to the provisions of the 
AU Convention. 
246
 The AU Convention suffers similar woes that plagues 
much of the UN Convention. In addition, honest tracking and accurate 
enforcement of the AU Convention’s provisions are more complex because 
much of its participating members are personally entrenched in corruption. 
Nevertheless, both the AU and UN Convention are great indicators that 
minimizing corruption is not a war that can be fought alone. Instead, 
battling corruption takes a coordinated effort from domestic and 
international allies.   
3. African Youths  
The gargantuan number of Africa’s youth cannot be ignored. The 2015 
United Nations estimates stated that there were 1.2 billion youth in 
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Africa.
247
 Rephrased, African youth alone, aged 15-24, represents 
approximately 17% of the world’s population.248 This number will continue 
to grow. By 2055, the 2015 estimate of Africa’s youth is expected to more 
than double.
249
 Statistics show that by 2030, youth of working age in Africa 
will amount to 375 million people—the combined population of U.S. and 
Canada. 
250
  
While African youth population is an indicator of opportunities and new 
talents to come, Africa’s youth population in light of the continent’s current 
political and socio-economic status, poses many risk and challenges. The 
oil industry in Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, and others are undoubtedly 
controlled by politicians. For example, there are many state-controlled 
companies in Africa, like Sonangol, that were created to manage the 
country’s vast oil supply. Yet, despite the large number of African youths, 
the youth are widely underrepresented in Africa’s governance.  
“[T]he average age of an African president is 62, while the median age 
of Africa’s population is 19.5.” 251 Former president of Zimbabwe, Robert 
Mugabe, was the oldest President in Africa at the age of 94.
252
 He held the 
presidency for 37 years before his replacement came to power.
253
 Northwest 
of Zimbabwe lies Cameroon, whose current President is Paul Biya, age 
86.
254
 Biya has been in power since 1982.
255
 Many of Africa’s nations are 
democratic on paper, yet in reality, many leaders abuse power. Corruption 
and shady tactics are implicit in the tenure of many of these leaders as they 
‘win’ their re-election year after year.   
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Power consumes and power corrupts. The hesitation of Africa’s leaders 
to step away from the helm of leadership is further indication of the 
intoxicating effects absolute power has on the mind. Africa’s aging leaders 
continue to make decisions, while its fledging youth are forced to live with 
the consequences.
256
 Because of the pervasiveness of corruption in the 
African economy, today’s African youths must reckon with the reality of 
corruption being a normal occurrence in almost every facet of life. A 
change is needed, because governance in Africa cannot be left alone to its 
current leaders.   
In order to combat the spread of corruption in Africa’s O&G industry, 
Africa’s youths must assume a more active role in the political process of 
their respective countries. The younger generation can contribute to the 
strengthening of democracy in Africa’s governing bodies. There must be an 
inclusion of youth, even at the presidential level. “Policy makers forget that 
youth are the backbone of any socioeconomic and political 
development.”257  
The wheels of change are already set in motion.  For example, youth led 
movements such as Senegal’s Y’en a marre, and Burkina Faso’s Balai 
Citoyen, are prime indicators of African youth’s ability to reinforce 
constitutional accountability in its leaders. 
258
 Youth led movements have 
quickly become a beacon of hope for many of Africa’s younger 
generations, partly because of the movement’s effects and ability to correct 
the poverty-stricken image of Africa. “These civil society movements are a 
breath of fresh air compared to the drab and essentially interchangeable 
political classes.” 259 
There are many African youth initiatives. For example, there are 
initiatives like Africa for Africa Youths in Action and Africa Youth 
Initiative Network that work to prioritize the needs of African youth, and 
correct the detrimental effect of some governmental policies.
260
 However, 
African countries must not only create and maintain programs for its youth 
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leaders, it must also utilize the talents already available in many of these 
initiatives. It is not enough to create an initiative that sparks dialogue, these 
initiatives must be taken to the next level. There must be intentional steps 
taken to tap into the talent pool of many African youth leaders, and 
integrate them into governmental institutions. Power must be pried open 
from the close-fisted hands of Africa’s entrenched leaders; the current 
governmental body should give room for fresh ideas. 
4. Judicial Independence  
Judicial independence is the ability of courts and legal actors to make 
decisions and perform their duties outside the influence of others.
261
 While 
defining judicial independence is relatively simple in theory, achieving 
judicial independence in reality is more complex. Across the SSA, undue 
influence in the judicial system is widespread. “[T]he type of judicial 
independence that is widely considered both the most important and the 
most difficult to achieve is independence from other governmental actors.” 
262
 This seems to be the case especially in Africa, because several of its 
suspected corrupt leaders continue to evade judicial reprimand.  Phrases 
like “why pay a lawyer when you can buy a judge” are not uncommon, and 
has effectively made the practice of law laughable in some areas. 
263
 Simply 
put, the justice system cannot be another tool controlled by corrupt elites.  
Achieving judicial independence in the SSA to fight against corruption is 
especially important yet very difficult. Across the SSA, African courts often 
encounter undue interference, many of which takes place informally.
264
 For 
instance, interference with justice systems takes the form of verbal or 
physical threats against judges, biased judges’ appointment, bribery, 
retaliatory attacks against judges, intimidations, influence pedaling, and 
abuse of court procedures. 
265
 Another major reason that impedes the stride 
toward judicial independence in Africa is the antiquated colonial design 
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flaw in African government, where the president has power over the 
appointment, promotion and removal of judges.
266
 One approach to mitigate 
this is to “institute a council of judicial personnel who are solely 
responsible for the selection and appointment of judges”, instead of vesting 
the power solely in the executive branch.
267
  
Without the coordinated efforts of the justice system to hold leaders 
accountable, corruption in Africa will continue to thrive. It is the right time 
for a judicial reform to take place across justice systems in Africa. Judges 
must be empowered to make impartial decisions free from undue influence 
from politics and other government branches. The role of Africa’s justice 
system in the fight against corruption is simply too sacrosanct to be 
ignored.  
Conclusion 
The O&G discoveries in Africa launched Africa into the limelight, and 
contributed to the continent’s display of power on the world stage. 
However, corruption in the O&G sector continues to threaten progress in 
Africa. Although corruption in this industry might seem like an isolated 
event, reality differs. O&G practices in Africa have wide-reaching effects in 
other nations as well as other sectors. This is why there must be a concerted 
effort from all parties involved to eliminate corruption.  
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